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ABSTRACT 
It could be argued that our survival as humans hinges on our ability to interact socially with 
others.  Our social interactions are influenced by evaluations of each other: we cooperate 
with those we like and avoid or are aggressive towards those we dislike or are afraid of. 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate how we come to learn to fear or dislike other 
individuals based on who they are; and how such learned evaluations influence actual social 
interactive behaviors. One elegant way to study how humans respond and react to threats in 
the environment is classical fear conditioning, where we can study how emotional values are 
created, upheld and changed. Research using classical fear conditioning has found that 
people are predisposed to develop stronger associations between threatening events and 
certain categories of stimuli (e.g., snakes, angry faces, and faces of individuals belonging to 
social out-groups). These biased aversions tend to persist even when circumstances change 
and the threat is no longer present. Though the fear system underlying this type of learning 
may be useful under some circumstances, it may also be at the root of some persistent social 
problems affecting modern societies (e.g., xenophobia). To address these questions 
experimentally, this thesis aimed to identify how we learn to associate threats to different 
social groups (e.g., racial and hierarchical) (Study I & Study II); whether learned aversions 
influence anti-social interactive behaviors (Study III); and to study the mechanisms of 
maladaptive reciprocal punishments in dyadic interactions (Study IV).  
     In Study I, we found that activity linked to both conditioned fear and perception of racial 
out-group members jointly contributed to the expression of race-based biases in learning and 
behavior. Importantly, we showed that brain activity in the fear-learning-bias network was 
related to participants' discriminatory interactions with new out-group members at a later 
time.  In Study II, we investigated the interaction between learned social dominance and 
social out-group (i.e., ethnicity) threats to understand if dominance hierarchy knowledge (i.e., 
observation of threats) can change direct experience with out-group members. We found a 
dissociation between implicit and explicit measures of out-group biases, such that implicit 
measures (i.e., Implicit Association Task and skin-conductance responses) of the participants 
revealed out-group biases, whereas their explicit measures (i.e., modern racial prejudice scale 
and a social interactive task; the modified ‘Cyberball’ game) did not.  In Study III, we found 
that learned aversions influenced future retaliation in a social context. Our results suggest 
that aggressive traits, when paired with aversive learning experiences, enhance the 
likelihood to act anti-socially toward others.  In Study IV, we demonstrate that participants 
punish co-players, despite the cost of receiving punishment back. These findings describe a 
form of self-punitive behavior previously documented in animals. Participants’ tendencies to 
administer shocks were exacerbated when the co-player initiated punishment, indicating that 
a small initial offense motivated punishing behavior over time. This finding suggests a simple 
experimental model of a vicious cycle of punishments. Together these findings highlight the 
role of aversive learning in social interactions.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Most of our social interactions depend on how we evaluate each other: we behave differently 
towards people we like compared to those we dislike. We tend to approach and help people 
we like, whereas we tend to avoid and aggress towards people we dislike. Aggression and 
avoidance behaviors can be adaptive if someone poses a threat to our well-being and survival. 
However, based on many real-life scenarios it seems as though people behave aggressively 
and anti-socially even when there is no real threat, and even when it sometimes comes at a 
cost. Our experiences from which we learn about threats or safety are not only isolated to 
specific circumstances, for example, our pre-conceived notions based on culturally learned 
information can change our experiences with someone. In studies contained within this thesis, 
I have examined the critical components of how we learn to associate aversive experiences to 
people based on who they are, and how these experiences are then reflected in social 
interactive behaviors. I have also examined how maladaptive anti-social behaviors (i.e., 
punishments) are initiated and maintained in a social context. In the following sections I will 
first outline the key concepts within the field of social aversive learning which are relevant to 
the studies contained within this thesis. I will then describe our methodological approach as 
well as some methodological considerations before summarizing the key findings from our 
studies. Lastly, I will attempt to situate our findings within the field of social aversive 
learning and interactive behavior, and I will also briefly describe some possible future 
directions and possible applications of our findings.   
1.1 SOCIAL AVERSIVE LEARNING 
If your neighbor behaves aggressively towards you, you may become scared and start to 
avoid him or her. Depending on the situation and your behavioral dispositions, you might 
instead choose to aggress back (i.e., reciprocate punishment). What role does classical 
conditioning—a simple associative learning process—play in social situations like these? 
Classical conditioning enables an organism to form associations between threatening events 
and preceding innocuous cues. Detecting and reacting to environmental threats clearly serves 
a critical evolutionary function, and fear learning offers an efficient way to transmit 
information about potential threats in the environment. While responses to naturally 
aversive events, such as painful stimuli (e.g., shocks) are hardwired reactions, organisms 
must learn to adapt these behaviors to predict and avoid many different types of potential 
threats. One critical question in fear learning is how to determine which stimuli do, and do 
not, pose a threat in the dynamic environment that we live in. The flexibility of fear learning 
allows the individual to generalize learned information in the past to make predictions about 
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the future. Although the ability to generalize fear responses to similar dangers in the future is 
adaptive behavior, it can also be maladaptive if learned experiences are generalized too 
broadly. Stimuli that are perceived as threats in one environment may not pose a threat in 
another environment. For example, encountering a snake on a hike should signal danger and 
result in an appropriate threat response; however, observing a snake in an enclosed space at a 
zoo does not require the same response. Moreover, in the case of social interactions, an 
inappropriate threat response could cause you to avoid or aggress towards an innocent 
neighbor simply because they resemble someone you had an aversive encounter with earlier 
that morning. Thus, the predictive values of certain signals for danger do not always lead to 
an appropriate response to these signals in the future. The maladaptive nature of 
overgeneralization of defensive behaviors can be exemplified by clinical anxiety disorders 
(e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), phobias, and panic disorders). Most importantly, 
in the studies within this thesis, I have examined the role of fear conditioning in various 
situations that involve social threat (involving other people). These findings are important for 
understanding the role of aversive learning in social interactions.  
1.2 BACKGROUND ON CLASSICAL CONDITIONING AND FEAR 
CONDITIONING 
In classical conditioning, learning is an association that is created between two stimuli 
presented close in time (Diamond & Rose, 1994; McLeod, 2007). For example, an initially 
neutral stimulus (i.e., the conditioned stimulus; CS), such as a sound, is presented together 
with rewarding or punishing stimulus (i.e., the unconditioned stimulus; US), that in turn 
evokes a behavioral response. As a result of the learned association between the CS and 
US, the organism shows an enhanced response to the CS alone, also referred to as a 
conditioned response (CR). This outcome indicates that an association has been created 
between the CS and US (Bouton & Moody, 2004; Diamond & Rose, 1994; Rescorla, 1988). 
Fear conditioning is specific form of classical conditioning used to investigate aversive 
learning in which the US is unpleasant. For example, fear conditioning experiments in rats 
use light or a sound as a neutral CS that does not evoke a fearful response. After repeated 
pairings between the CS and an aversive foot shock (US), the CS by itself can elicit a startle 
or freezing response (Davis, 1992; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Phelps, 2006a). That is, over 
time, the CS itself can come to evoke an anticipatory response, the conditioned response or 
CR in the rat. It is also important to understand how acquired fears change and diminish; for 
example, how one stops expressing conditioned responses to the sound by learning that the 
sound no longer poses any danger. This is done through extinction training. During 
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Extinction, all CSs are repeatedly presented again without the aversive US, allowing for the 
formation of new memory that the CS has become safe, which inhibits expression of the 
original fear memory (Lattal, Radulovic, & Lukowiak, 2006; Pavlov, 1927). At this point, the 
CR is considered extinguished (Davis, 1992; Fendt & Fanselow, 1999; Phelps, 2006a). 
Interestingly, extinguished fear can be recovered; it can re-emerge after extinction (i.e., 
spontaneous recovery), or as a result of a change in the context (i.e., the renewal effect), or 
from one or more unsignaled presentations of the US (i.e., the reinstatement effect). The re-
emergence of the previously learned fear suggest that extinction is a new learning process, 
and the fear reduction results from inhibition rather than erasure of the original fear memory 
(Bouton, Westbrook, Corcoran, & Maren, 2006; Ji & Maren, 2007).  
1.2.1 Psychophysiological Responses in Fear Conditioning 
What happens when you feel threatened? Fear is characterized by both high arousal and 
negative valence (Lang, 1995), and the expression of fear is characterized, for example, 
through a common psychophysiological response pattern including potentiation of the 
startle reflex, increases in skin conductance response (SCR), blood pressure and heart rate 
acceleration (Globisch, Hamm, & Esteves, 1999). The startle reaction is a defensive reflex 
that is elicited in response to a sudden and intense stimulus such a loud noise or a light 
flash. In humans, the blink reflex is the component of the startle response commonly used 
as an index of CR in human fear conditioning preparations, and within this context, it is 
commonly referred to as the fear-potentiated startle (FPS) (Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000). 
The basis of the FPS is that the startle blink reflex is potentiated when the individual is in 
an aversive or fearful state and the magnitude of the startle reflex has been shown to be 
directly related to negative stimulus valence (Hamm & Weike, 2005). Another index that is 
commonly used is skin conductance response (SCR), also known as the electrodermal 
response. This is the measure I have used in Studies I-III of this thesis. SCRs reflect the 
phasic increase in skin conductance that occurs in response to physiologically arousing 
stimuli, such as negative or positive pictures, and are modulated both by stimulus novelty 
and intensity as well as by attentional processes (Öhman, 1979). In human fear 
conditioning, CR is commonly inferred from increased SCRs in the presence of a CS that is 
predictive of the US (the CS+) compared to SCRs to the control stimulus (CS-). The 
difference between these measures is referred to as differential SCR. There are many 
advantages in using SCRs; it is a non-intrusive measure, and interestingly, SCR changes 
have been linked to changes in amygdala activity during fear conditioning (e.g., Cheng, 
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Knight, Smith, & Helmstetter, 2006; LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998; 
Wood, Ver Hoef, & Knight, 2014). 
1.2.2 The Neural Networks of Fear Conditioning 
Researchers have made a lot of progress in mapping the neural circuitry and processes critical 
for understanding fear learning. The central structure in the circuitry for the expression of fear 
CRs is the Amygdala (Cheng et al., 2006; Delgado, Nearing, Ledoux, & Phelps, 2008; 
Phelps, 2006b; Sehlmeyer et al., 2009). Other brain regions including the hippocampus, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and anterior insula (AI) have also been found to be 
involved in fear conditioning and extinction. Below, I will briefly discuss the significance of 
these regions in fear conditioning (for thorough reviews, see Ji & Maren, 2007; Sehlmeyer et 
al., 2009). Much of what we know about the basic neurobiological mechanisms of fear 
learning stems from classical conditioning in non-human animals. Studies have 
demonstrated that lesions of the amygdala inhibit many measures of conditioned and 
unconditioned fear responses (e.g., freezing, increases in blood pressure, heart rate changes, 
or fear-potentiated startle) (Fanselow, 1994; Kapp, Whalen, Supple, & Pascoe, 1992; LaBar 
& LeDoux, 1996). Recent evidence suggests that different parts of the amygdala play 
different functional roles. Two sub-regions within the amygdala are particularly important 
for fear conditioning: the basolateral complex (BLA), which includes the lateral (LA) and 
basal (B) nuclei, and the central nucleus (CE). In brief, relevant projections within the 
amygdala include the formation of CS-US association in the LA, which serves as an input 
to the CE. The CE in turn controls the expression of conditioned responses (CR) by sending 
information to other regions; for example (1) to the hypothalamus, which has been found to 
be important for mediating autonomic responses and in humans can be indexed by skin 
conductance response, and (2) to the brainstem which has been implicated in the regulation 
of behavioral expressions of fear (Davis, 1992; Fendt & Fanselow, 1999; Ji & Maren, 
2007). While the neurophysiological substrates of fear conditioning have mostly been 
investigated in rodents using invasive procedures, the role of particular brain regions in fear 
conditioning has more recently been explored in humans using noninvasive functional brain 
imaging techniques. Research in humans using functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) for 
example, has provided support for the notion that amygdala plays a critical role in the 
acquisition and expression of conditioned fear (e.g., Büchel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 
1998; Fullana et al., 2016; Sehlmeyer et al., 2009). Specifically, fMRI studies have shown 
increased blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal (a proxy for neural activity) in 
the amygdala after a neutral stimuli has been associated with an aversive event; the 
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magnitude of this amygdala activation has also been shown to be correlated with SCRs as 
an indication of arousal to the CS event which is one the most common ways to study CR 
in humans (Büchel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998; LaBar & Phelps, 1998; Phelps, 2006). 
All of these results provide evidence of the amygdala’s involvement in fear conditioning in 
humans. Studies have also shown that the vmPFC and hippocampus are important in fear 
conditioning. More specifically, it has been reported that activation in both these regions are 
especially important in extinction learning (Lang et al., 2009; Milad et al., 2007). One 
critical aspect of extinction is that it involves formation of new memories rather than removal 
of old fear memories that had been acquired during acquisition (for review see, Bouton, 
2004). The anterior insula (AI) has also been implicated in fear conditioning as response to 
anticipation of fear, pain, processing of emotionally relevant stimuli, and arousal (Craig, 
2009; Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Lamm & Singer, 2010). 
1.3 ‘NOT ALL STIMULI ARE CREATED EQUAL’ 
In the early 1970’s, the evolutionary preparedness theory was proposed by, Seligman (1971). 
This theory relied on the assumption that there is a functional significance of maintaining 
learned fears to a certain class of so called ‘prepared stimuli’ in order to avoid imminent 
threats. Empirical studies both in humans (Öhman, Fredrikson, Hugdahl, & Rimmo, 1976) 
and non-human primates (Mineka, Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984) have supported this 
notion. In humans, conditioned fear responses to fear-relevant stimuli (e.g., snakes and 
spiders) have consistently been found to resist extinction compared to fear-irrelevant stimuli 
(e.g., flowers and butterflies) (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). The idea that humans, like other 
animals, have a tendency to preferentially learn and retain some associations more readily 
than others has important implications for understanding social behavior. It provides a 
potential mechanism to understand the emergence and maintenance of social biases. 
Critically, preferential learning has been extended to angry facial expression (Öhman & 
Dimberg, 1996), and later to other social groups (e.g., race) (Mallan, Sax, & Lipp, 2009; 
Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005). These observations suggest several research avenues 
to examine biased learning occurring in social interactions, which is the main focus of the 
current thesis. However, in order to better understand the potential links between aversive 
learning and social-cognitive processes, it is important to consider research on social biases.  
1.3.1 Social Group Biases Based on Race 
Social group biases are central aspect of human behavior. People often categorize others 
according to their race, gender, age, religion, political affiliation, or any other salient 
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social category. It could be argued that evolution may have biologically prepared people 
to be able to quickly identify others as belonging to their in-group or out-group. Across 
many different scenarios, people tend to prefer, and be more helpful towards, their in-
group members compared to their out-group members. Further, it has been demonstrated 
that emotional expressions from in-group members are encoded faster and more 
accurately; empathic responding is stronger to in-group members; in-group members’ 
faults are downplayed more than out-group members; and trust and cooperation are 
extended to in-groups more than to out-groups (for review, see De Dreu & Kret, 2016). 
In a study by Hein and colleagues (2010), soccer team belongingness was used as a 
social group manipulation to investigate costly helping behavior. Participants witnessed 
a fan of their favorite team (in-group member) or of a rival team (out-group member) 
experience pain, and were later asked to choose to help the fans by enduring physical 
pain themselves to reduce the others’ pain. Their results showed increased AI response 
to when participants witnessed an in-group member, as compared with an out-group 
member, suffering pain, in line with studies showing empathy modulation (Hein, Silani, 
Preuschoff, & Batson, 2010). Importantly, they found increased nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc) activity (known to be involved in reward processing) and decrease in activation 
in AI  (known to be involved in aversive experiences and empathy for others’ 
discomfort), when participants were witnessing an out-group member suffering pain 
(Grit Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010). These results suggest that it can 
be more aversive to see an in-group member suffer and more rewarding to watch an out-
group member suffer. 
     The flip side of in-group favoritism is out-group bias; decades of research have 
shown that social categorization often elicits stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination 
towards out-group members (Brewer, 1999). One social category that has received much 
attention in research recently is racism and racial prejudice. Within the field of social 
psychology, prejudice refers more specifically to evaluations (i.e., attitudes) and 
emotional responses towards a group and its members (Amodio, 2014). Despite 
globalization and increased diversity, prejudices continue to be a core problem in 
intergroup conflict and discrimination. Our social norms have become more egalitarian, 
thus prejudices have become more difficult to detect, study, and ultimately change 
(Amodio, 2014). It has been suggested that because of pro-social norms, people may 
sometimes engage in self-regulatory methods (e.g., cognitive control) to adjust their 
behaviors. However, these types of biases often operate implicitly, and they can be 
activated, and influence judgments and behaviors without conscious awareness 
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(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Olson & Fazio, 2006). For the past few decades, scientists 
interested in race and prejudice have increasingly used methods of electrophysiology, 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other physiological measures in an 
effort to identify the processes through which these biases are formed. These methods 
increase our understanding of how people perceive and evaluate race and how these 
processes relate to a range of social behaviors that can have consequential effects in 
social interactions. A network of regions have been proposed to be involved in race 
perception and racial prejudice involving amygdala, fusiform face area, insula, striatum 
and ventromedial frontal cortices (see reviews, Amodio, 2014; Kubota et al., 2012). 
Many of these brain regions have also been implicated in fear conditioning (see section 
1.2.2). Most research in the field of race perception has used passive viewing paradigms 
to understand these processes. It is well understood that faces are processed quickly, 
however, research has shown that there are fundamental differences in processing racial 
out-group compared to in-group faces.  
     There are primarily two different theories that account for these types of differences. 
One is the “expertise” account, where it is argued that frequent contact with one’s own 
racial group members leads to better discrimination of facial information of one’s own 
racial group (compared to one’s racial out-group) (Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, & Tan, 1989). 
This has been supported by studies showing enhanced activity in the ‘fusiform face area’ 
(FFA), for same-race relative to other-race faces (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 
2001). In previous work, this brain region has been associated with processing and 
individuating faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & 
Puce, 2004) and general perceptual expertise (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & 
Gore, 1999). Another theory suggests that in-group members are considered 
motivationally relevant or important, and therefore, lead participants to attend more to 
them (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004). In line with this account, it has been 
demonstrated that people are better at discriminating between faces belonging to 
members of an out-group when they display cues signaling threat (e.g., angry facial 
expressions) (compared to faces belonging to members of one’s in-group) (Ackerman et 
al., 2006; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). Researchers have also found that negative 
emotions from other races are detected more easily, and are more likely to be correctly 
categorized as negative even if facial expression itself is ambiguous (Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004; Liu, Lin, Xu, Zhang, & Luo, 2015).  
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     The amygdala has also been implicated in social perception and evaluation of other-
race faces. Several studies have found increased amygdala activity when viewing images 
of racial out-group compared to racial in-group members (Hart et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, it has been found that this difference in amygdala activity correlates with 
implicit measures of racial bias (Kubota et al., 2012). Although these findings have led 
researchers to argue that the differences in amygdala activation during intergroup 
perception could be evidence of negativity—including disgust and fear—toward 
stigmatized groups (e.g., Harris & Fiske, 2006; Krendl, Macrae, Kelley, Fugelsang, & 
Heatherton, 2006) others have proposed that the amygdala may play a role in processing 
motivationally-relevant stimuli in general (e.g., Krendl, Kensinger, & Ambady, 2012; 
Stillman, Van Bavel, & Cunningham, 2015). For example, if race is the most salient 
social category, the amygdala may be responsive to members of groups who are 
stereotypically perceived as more threatening; however, if there are other bases for 
categorization, the amygdala may be responsive to members of groups that are currently 
relevant, such as group affiliation (i.e., in-group vs. out-group)(Van Bavel & 
Cunningham, 2009). Many findings mentioned here (regarding racial social groups) 
concern the basic mechanisms of social cognition that, to different extents, underlie other 
forms of biases, such as those based on gender, sexual preference and nationality. Given 
that social groups are perceived differently, and that group-belongingness can influence 
behavior, fear conditioning provides a powerful paradigm for exploring how such in-
group and out-group learning biases are acquired and changed in a laboratory setting. 
1.3.2 Fear Conditioning and Racial Biases 
Studies using fear conditioning have investigated how learned fears towards out-group 
members are acquired, expressed, and changed. In one study by Olsson and colleagues (2005) 
participants were presented with unfamiliar faces of two black and two white male 
individuals with neutral expressions. During fear acquisition, one stimulus (CS+) from each 
stimulus category was paired with a mild electric shock (US). The other stimulus from each 
category (CS–) was presented without shock. During the extinction phase that followed, all 
CSs were presented again but no shocks were administered. SCRs were measured during 
both acquisition and extinction. The conditioned fear response (CR) was assessed as the 
differential SCR (CS+ minus CS–) from the same stimulus category (Black or White)2, The 
                                                
2 In this way, this manipulation controls for differences in the emotional salience of stimulus 
categories as a confounding variable. 
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results indicated that the faces from a racial out-group were more readily associated with an 
aversive stimulus and were more resistant to extinction than the faces from an in-group 
(Olsson et al., 2005). However, the neural networks of fear learning to racial in-group and 
out-group members are unknown. We sought out to address this gap in our understanding 
of the neural networks of fear learning to in- and out-group members in Study I of this 
thesis.  
1.3.3 Fear Conditioning and Social Dominance Hierarchy  
Learning about threats in a social environment is a core component of human behavior and 
helps protect a person from dangerous stimuli or from stimuli one has previously had a 
negative experience with (Seligman, 1971). Social groups of humans and non-human animals 
are organized along dominance hierarchies, which help regulate access to food and mates, 
and help determine who constitutes a physical threat to whom. As modern humans we live in 
relatively egalitarian groups compared to our ancestors, but many of our social 
environments still contain situations where social hierarchy can be experienced as a threat 
(Sapolsky, 2004). Learning about the relative dominance of others, and to adaptively respond 
to their threat value, is central to one’s health and survival (Adler et al., 2008; Kaplan & 
Manuck, 1999; Sapolsky, 2005). Previous research suggests that being a member of a high-
status group will increase prejudice towards out-groups (Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & 
Stallworth, 1991), increase in-group favoritism (Guimond, Dif, & Aupy, 2002), even when 
status is randomly assigned (Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006). Much of 
past research has relied on static images with facial features and body postures as 
dominance cues (Marsh, Blair, Jones, Soliman, & Blair, 2009; Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008). However, social dominance rank can also be inferred by the probability that one 
(oneself or someone else) would win or lose an agonistic confrontation against in-group 
conspecifics (Rowell, 1974). In a social setting, confrontations are not only relevant to the 
people involved in the confrontation, but to everyone that might be observing as well. 
Indeed, across species, learning about the value of stimuli and situations through observing 
interactions is common (Olsson & Phelps, 2007), and reduces the risk of injury for the 
observer. Thus, the evidence to date suggests that observing confrontations can transmit 
critical information about social status.  
     As reviewed above (section 1.3.2), there are biases in threat responses towards social 
racial out-group members which tend to persist even in the absence of the threat (i.e., 
extinction) (Kubota et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2005). In a recent study, this kind of learning 
was extended to faces associated with varying levels of experimentally induced social 
T. Molapour   The Role of Aversive Learning  
 
  10 
dominance, showing that relatively higher levels of dominance of a target face was associated 
with more persistent threat learning (Haaker, Molapour, & Olsson, 2016). In this study, the 
researchers used a fear conditioning paradigm to investigate the acquisition and expression 
of threats associated with dominant and subordinate others learned through observation 
(Haaker et al., 2016). Participants first learned about the dominance rank of others by 
observing their dyadic confrontations. During subsequent fear learning, the dominant and 
subordinate others were both equally predictive of an aversive consequence (mild electric 
shock) to the participant. Importantly, the results from this study revealed that threats 
associated with a dominant person elicited stronger and more persistent learned threat 
responses as measured by physiological arousal and amygdala activity. These results 
suggest that aversive experiences associated with dominant others pose more of a threat and 
are more resist to extinction than those associated with subordinate others. It is well 
understood that there are learning biases based on race, and dominance, but it is highly 
relevant to understand how these racial and dominance based biases interact in modern 
heterogeneous societies. Building upon the example described above of how our direct 
experiences with someone else can alter our social interactions with our neighbor: how are 
our social interactions with the neighbor affected after observing an altercation they had 
with the mailman? Does whether they ‘win’ or ‘lose’ the altercation play a role in how we 
interact with them in the future? Furthermore, does the ethnicity of the neighbor play a 
more important role than their social status? We examined these questions in Study II of 
this thesis.  
1.4 AGGRESSIVE ANTI-SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
Most of what I have covered so far highlights how we can use fear conditioning to understand 
how threats associated with members of different social groups are acquired, expressed and 
changed. One critical question that remains unknown is how the development of aversive 
learning is related to behavior in interactive contexts. As discussed in the previous sections of 
this thesis, there is strong evidence that there are differences in aversive learning based on 
whom (i.e., social group belongingness) we learn from, but the relationship between learned 
aversions and actual social behavior is still unknown. Although there are a few studies that 
suggest that our learned aversive experiences through conditioning can be related to anti-
social behavior, there is not much research indicating the exact relationship between fear-
conditioning and actual anti-social behavior. However, a few studies have shown that stimuli 
associated with aversions through conditioning can enhance aggression. For example, a study 
in rats has shown that conditioned stimuli increased the probability of fighting behavior when 
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given the opportunity (Hutchinson, Renfrew, & Young, 1971), and one study in humans 
(Fraczek, 1974) showed that painful experiences associated with a specific colored stimulus 
incited stronger aggression towards a peer.  
     With regards to aggression, historical records show that widespread aggressive and violent 
behaviors can be traced back to the earliest prehistoric times (DeWall, Anderson, & 
Bushman, 2011), suggesting that violence is an intrinsic part of human behavior. Aggressive 
behavior usually involves the intent to harm another person or a group; the violence can be 
in physical or non-physical form. Psychologists have been using laboratory experiments in 
which aggressive behaviors can be assessed in a safe and ethical fashion (Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002; Berkowitz, 1993). In these aggression paradigms the participants are 
typically allowed to act aggressively/anti-socially toward others. These paradigms have 
revealed that although people are reluctant to act aggressively towards others in general, 
some situational factors, such as competiveness, provocation, and aggressive cues (e.g., guns) 
can influence participants to aggress more often (Anderson and Bushman, 2002). 
Characteristics of the agent (e.g., personality traits, attitudes, genetic predispositions) are also 
important factors in contributing to aggressive behavior (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). 
Furthermore, aggression theories have also implicated that general arousal and aggressive 
cues combine to increase aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Bandura, 1973; 
Berkowitz & Lepage, 1967). That is to say, if an angered person’s arousal is attributed to the 
frustrating or insulting source of the anger, subsequent aggression will increase (Rule & 
Nesdale, 1976). In contrast to how fear motivates escape, anger motivates aggression, which 
stops ongoing and/or deters future transgressions.  Yet few, if any, studies have investigated 
how learning mechanisms known to underlie learned aversions through Pavlovian 
conditioning can help to explain interactive behavior (specifically anti-social behavior) in the 
normal population. Given the prevalence of anti-social behavior in everyday life (Cowie, 
Naylor, Rivers, Smith, & Pereira, 2002; Folger & Baron, 1996), understanding the underlying 
mechanisms is crucial to illuminate the dark side of human psychology, and to inform 
preventive strategies. Thus, we examined the role of fear conditioning in anti-social behaviors 
in Study III. 
1.4.1 Maladaptive Aggression  
Can a small initial offense cause a longstanding feud? If your neighbor takes your newspaper, 
will you punish them? Individuals have evolved adaptive responses to threats occurring in the 
environment, thereby enhancing the organism’s probability of survival (see Ledoux, 2012). 
Certain environmental events that are perceived as threatening, frustrating, or provocative, by 
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someone can lead to responses such as avoidance or aggression —serving an adaptive 
function (Blanchard, Bassett, & Koshland, 1977). However, aggression can also be 
maladaptive—as a result of heightened reactivity of the threat response system (Blair, 2007). 
The brain’s threat response system involves amygdala-hypothalamus-periaqueductal gray 
which is regulated by several other brain regions (e.g., frontal cortex) (Gregg & Siegel, 2001) 
an impaired ability to regulate this system can lead to an increased chance of initiating 
aggression rather than freezing or flight (Blair, 2004). Others have argued that acting out 
aggression can be rewarding; for example it has been demonstrated that aggressive behavior 
is associated with activity in the brain’s reward system in response to aggressive social 
stimuli (de Quervain et al., 2004; Decety, Michalska, Yuko, & Lahey, 2009; Golden et al., 
2016). For example, punishing defectors in an economic game activated the dorsal striatum, 
which has been implicated in the processing of rewards (de Quervain et al., 2004).  
     Importantly, studies have shown that maladaptive behavior can be self-reinforced; it has 
been demonstrated in several species including rats (Brown, Martin, & Morrow, 1964) 
monkeys (Kelleher & Morse, 1968; McKearney, 1969) and humans (Renner & Tinsley, 
1976) that learned contingencies  between a behavior and an outcome is difficult to unlearn 
(even if they are maladaptive). For example, studies in squirrel monkeys and rats have 
demonstrated that performing an action that results in the reception of painful electric shocks 
is counter-intuitively reinforced rather than inhibited after the behavior-outcome 
contingencies change, indicating what is called ‘self-punitive behavior’ (Melvin and Anson, 
1969; Morse et al., 1967). This indicates that behaviors with aversive outcomes (i.e., 
maladaptive) can be self-reinforced (Seymour, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). We hypothesize that 
self-reinforcing punishment in social interactions can be a factor to why vendettas emerge. To 
our knowledge, no experimental research has shown how and why vendettas emerge in 
dyadic interactions. In Study IV we examined how people reciprocated punishments when 
doing so was maladaptive (i.e., always resulting in receiving same number of shocks back), in 
the absence of economic or other instructed incentives other than received punishment.  
     In summary we have discussed the role of aversive learning in everyday life, and how fear 
conditioning offers a way to study how we acquire and express fears towards others based on 
who we learn about. We also provide evidence for how social aversive learning could offer 
insight into social interactive behaviors. We also discussed, how behaviors with aversive 
outcomes (i.e., maladaptive) could sometimes be self-reinforced. In the different studies of 
this thesis we have made an attempt to unravel some of the core components of how aversive 
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learning based on who learn from and about can influence social interactive behaviors, and 
how. 
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2 AIMS 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate what role aversive learning has in social 
interactions. Specifically, we sought to examine whether aversive learning differs based on 
whom we learn from and about, and if so, whether these differences in aversive learning are 
reflected in interactive social behaviors. We also aimed at understanding how reciprocal 
punishments are initiated and upheld in social interactions.  
2.1 STUDY I AIM 
• To examine the neural activity associated with aversive learning to members of in-
groups and out-groups (i.e., racial), and whether behavior and brain activity related to 
this learning would impact future interactions with new in-group and out-group 
members.   
2.2 STUDY II AIM 
• To examine the interaction between knowledge about individuals’ social dominance 
rank and ethnic group belonging during aversive learning (i.e, fear conditioning).  
2.3 STUDY III AIM 
• To investigate whether learned aversions cause retaliatory behavior in a social 
interactive context. 
2.4 STUDY IV AIM 
• To examine whether maladaptive punishment (i.e., self-punitive) occurs in dyadic 
interactions, and how such behaviors are initiated and maintained.  
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3 METHODS 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
 All participants (N=193) gave their written consent before participation and were naive to 
the purpose of the experiment. The procedures were executed in compliance with relevant 
laws and institutional guidelines, and were approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board 
of Stockholm. Participants were paid for their participation at the conclusion of the 
experiments. 
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI  
For all of our experiments (except for Study IV) we used different faces as stimuli. For 
Study I, we used Black faces expressing a neutral facial expression from the NimStim facial 
database (Tottenham et al., 2009), and in Studies I and III, we used White faces from the 
Radboud Faces Database (RaFD) (Langner et al., 2010). We also used the Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces for the White faces (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt & Öhman, 1998) and 
RaFD for the Middle Eastern faces in both side-view and front-view in Study II. In Study IV 
we used schematic figures of faces.  
     For Studies I and II we created a Social Interactive Task (SIT) (modified from the 
original “cyberball” game; Williams & Jarvis, 2006), in order to measure social interactive 
behavior. We devised this task to simulate real social interactions. In Study I, target faces 
consisted of one Black face (NimStim) and one White face (Radboud), while in Study II the 
target faces consisted of one Middle Eastern face (RaFD) and one White face. We created 
three additional distractor faces by morphing one of each category (Black or Middle Eastern 
and White) using a morphing program (Squirlz Morph: www.xiberpix.com). The new 
distractor faces consisted of 75%, 50%, and 25% similarity to the out-group face (See Figure 
1).   
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Figure 1.  Illustration of the interactive environment during the SIT in Study I. 
Participants were presented with one Black and one White face and three distractor 
(racially-morphed) faces. Participants were asked to pass the ball to each one of the 
other players. This task was also used in Study II but with White and Middle Eastern 
faces.  
     In Study I, the visual display was presented via MR-compatible LCD video goggles 
[NordicNeuroLab (NNL), Bergen, Norway] connected to a PC running Presentation 
(Version 14, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., www.neurobs.com). In Studies II-IV the 
stimuli presentations were managed using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider et al., 2002). Shock 
deliverance was controlled by monopolar DC-pulse electric stimulation (STM200; Biopac 
Systems Inc., www.biopac.com). In all studies, before the start of the experimental sessions, 
the intensity of the electric shock (US) delivered to the wrist was calibrated for each 
participant. In a standard ‘work-up’ procedure, shock intensity was gradually increased until 
participants appraised it as uncomfortable, but not painful. Before the procedure, the shock 
electrode was attached to the participants' right wrist and a conductive gel (Signa, Parker) 
between the electrodes and the skin.  
3.2.1 Electric Shocks 
In our experiments (Studies I-II) we used electric shock as an aversive stimulus (US), which 
is a common human fear conditioning procedure (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002; Olsson 
et al., 2005; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). We also used electric shocks to investigate aggressive 
behavior in a social context in Study III and the underlying mechanisms of retaliatory 
behaviors in Study IV. The term aggression refers to a wide spectrum of behaviors, in the 
psychological literature, it is defined as any behavior intended to harm another person that 
wants to avoid being harmed (For review, see Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Many 
Overview of studies 
  19 
researchers have previously operationalized aggressive behavior by measuring the intensity 
of electric shocks administered to another individual (e.g., Bailey & Taylor, 1991; 
Bushman, 1995; Giancola & Zeichner, 1995). Others have used monetary or point 
penalties, verbal attacks, and negative evaluations as proxies for aggression (Bailey & 
Taylor, 1991; Check & Dyck, 1986; Dougherty, Bjork, Marsh, & Moeller, 2000). In 
Studies III & IV we used administration of shocks, because we were interested in studying 
the effects of learning based on physically aversive consequences. Additionally, shock 
administration was a convenient method in our experimental paradigm. Finally, the use of 
shocks enabled us to avoid adding motivational factors, such as monetary gains and losses, 
to the paradigm.   
3.3 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS 
3.3.1 Skin Conductance Response 
The skin conductance response (SCR), represents one of the oldest measurements in the 
history of psychophysiological research. SCRs reflect the phasic increase in skin 
conductance that occurs in response to physiologically arousing stimuli. Both negative and 
positive stimuli evoke SCRs, which is modulated both by stimulus novelty, intensity and by 
attentional processes (Öhman, 1979). The SCR reflects the change in electrodermal 
conductance on the palmar surface of the hands and the sole of the feet through eccrine sweat 
glands, which increases due to sympathetic arousal (Öhman, 1971). In humans, SCRs are 
usually measured by a pair of electrodes attached to the distal phalanges of the index and 
middle finger. In the context of fear conditioning, SCR is the most commonly used index of 
CR and is commonly inferred from increased SCRs in the presence of a CS that is 
predictive of the US (the CS+) as compared to SCRs to the control stimulus (CS-). The 
difference between these measures is referred to as differential SCR. There are many 
advantages in using SCRs; it is a non-intrusive measure, and interestingly, SCR changes 
have been linked to changes in amygdala activity during fear conditioning (e.g. Cheng, 
Knight, Smith, & Helmstetter, 2006; Knight, Nguyen, & Bandettini, 2005; LaBar et al., 
1998). 
3.4 FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING  
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a neuroimaging technique with both 
clinical and research applications. There are many advantages to use fMRI relative to other 
functional neuroimaging techniques for research applications. One advantage of using 
contrast fMRI over forms of functional imaging, is that BOLD contrast fMRI is non-
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invasive and does not expose the subject to radiation. In research we often use fMRI in 
awake humans engaged in a different kinds of behavioral and cognitive tasks. The activity 
measured in fMRI is the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response. When particular 
region in the brain is in use (i.e., neurons firing), blood flow to that region also increases 
(Brown, Perthen, Liu, & Buxton, 2007; Logothetis & Wandell, 2004; Logothetis, 2008). One 
can then detect the changes in the BOLD signal over time, which constitutes an indirect 
measure of electrical neural activity (Goense et al. 2012, Logothetis & Wandell, 2004). 
Although fMRI has been very useful for examining the neural correlates of many different 
tasks, it also has limitations. One common methodological consideration in fMRI is head 
movement, which influences both the quality of the scans and the functional inferences that 
can be made from them (Khanna, Altmeyer, Zhuo, & Steven, 2015; Yendiki, Koldewyn, 
Kakunoori, Kanwisher, & Fischl, 2014). This is important because head movement causes 
the voxels to be mis-aligned with the corresponding brain tissue across the whole scanning 
session. In order to avoid this problem as much as possible, we asked our participants to keep 
their head as still as possible during the experiment, and we used extra padding in the radio 
frequency (RF) head coil to further help to keep their head in place. For the remaining 
unavoidable movements, we used SPM 8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, Wellcome Center 
for Neuroimaging), which uses a motion correction algorithm as part of the preprocessing of 
the data. We did not need to exclude any participants due to excessive head movement in the 
fMRI study (Study I).   
3.4.1 Parametric Analysis 
 
 Based on studies in both in fear conditioning (Büchel et al., 1998; LaBar et al., 1998) and 
race perception (Hart et al., 2000; Kubota et al., 2012) showing important time-dependent 
effects, we wanted to examine possible changes of activity in a given region. For example, 
previous studies have found temporally graded amygdala responsivity in both animal and 
human populations (Quirk et al., 1997). Therefore, in addition to categorical conditioned 
responses (CRs) (i.e., overall activity), we also examined differences in parametric 
responses linearly changing over time. The parametric modulation allowed us to examine 
possible interactions between stimulus and time that are absent in categorical analyses of 
the mean responses. Both categorical and parametric effects were analyzed separately on 
group level in a 2 × 2 full factorial design including the parameter estimates of each CS 
separated on two factors: CS type (CS+ and CS−) and race (Black and White). We defined 
the interaction contrast from the 2 × 2 factorial design as (Black CS+ minus Black CS−) > 
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(White CS+ minus White CS−), thus significant voxels containing neuronal populations 
that are specifically involved in fear learning to Black faces as compared to White faces.  
3.4.2 Psychophysiological Interaction Connectivity Analysis   
In Study I, we evaluated changes in the degree of neural connectivity using 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI)  analysis (Friston et al., 1997). A PPI measures the 
strength of connectivity between a seed region and other brain regions changing with the 
experimental variable. Thus, a significant PPI indicates that the connectivity between one 
region and another increases significantly with the experimental or psychological variable 
(Friston et al., 1997). We specifically used a generalized PPI toolbox (gPPI; 
http://www.nitrc.org/projects/gppi), which compared to standard PPIs in SPM, allows for the 
interaction of more than two task conditions in the same PPI model and improves model fit, 
specificity to true-negative findings, and sensitivity to true-positive findings (McLaren et al., 
2012). In our analysis we examined connectivity changes between a pre-defined seed region 
(i.e., amygdala) and the rest of the brain. The interaction terms in the PPIs were computed 
by multiplying the time series from the psychological regressors with the physiological 
variable. To examine the effect of the interaction terms, activity within the amygdala was 
regressed on a voxel-wise basis against the interaction with the physiological and 
psychological variables serving as regressors of interest. In our experiment, the individual 
CR Black > CR White contrast images were entered into separate second-level 2 (CS) × 2 
(Race) ANOVAs for the left and right amygdala to determine whether there were any CS × 
Race interactions on functional connectivity. The resulting activation maps from this 
analysis reflect the functional connectivity between amygdala and other brain regions that 
was significant for fear learning to out-group and in-group faces. As such, this connectivity 
analysis allowed us to examine the connectivity between amygdala and other brain regions 
during learning and expression of learned fear to out-group and in-group faces. 
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4 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES    
In the following section, I will briefly summarize the main findings and conclusions of the 
individual studies. For details, I refer the reader to the full manuscripts attached at the end of 
this thesis.    
4.1 STUDY I: NEURAL CORRELATES OF BIASED SOCIAL FEAR LEARNING 
AND INTERACTION IN AN INTERGROUP CONTEXT 
4.1.1 Study I Background and Rationale 
In light of previous research which has demonstrated that a learned association between a 
fearful experience and a member of a social out-group (i.e., ethnic) is more resistant to 
change than a learned association between a fearful experience and a member of an in-
group (Olsson et al., 2005; Kubota et al., 2012), we wanted to investigate the neural activity 
underlying these types of aversive learning biases. Additionally, we wanted to examine 
whether the neural activity was predictive of future interactive behavior to new in and out-
group members. Previous research has identified a network of regions involved in the 
acquisition and expression of conditioned fear (LaBar and LeDoux, 1996; Phelps and 
LeDoux, 2005). In addition to the amygdala–a key region involved in the acquisition of 
fear—the vmPFC, hippocampal complex, and insula have also been implicated in fear 
conditioning. However, a different line of research has identified how racial out-groups are 
perceived in passive viewing paradigms, and has revealed a network of brain regions with 
many overlapping regions similar to the fear conditioning neural network (e.g., amygdala, 
and insula). We hypothesized that brain regions linked to both fear conditioning and race 
perception jointly contribute to aversive learning to in- and out-group members. We were 
specifically interested in time-dependent changes that were associated with the CR to in-and 
out-group faces. Moreover, we also investigated the connectivity between the amygdala and 
the rest of the brain. We predicted that a learning bias would involve changes in activity over 
time. Based on previous research on threatening stimuli (Anderson and Phelps, 2001, Hariri 
et al., 2003 and Morris, 1998), we expected increased connectivity between the amygdala and 
the visual cortex during perception of conditioned out-group faces.  
4.1.2 Study I: Results and Conclusions 
We demonstrated that activity in brain regions previously linked to conditioned fear, 
and perception of individuals belonging to racial or stigmatized out-groups, jointly contribute 
to differential brain activity and biased behavior based on race. During Acquisition of CRs, 
we found increased activity in the amygdala, AI, and ACC to both Black and White faces. 
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During Extinction we found enhanced activity in the dorsal AI for CR to Black vs. White 
faces (see Figure 2), which is indicative of aversive subjective experiences (Craig, 2009) 
and processing of stigmatized individuals (Harris and Fiske, 2006). Further, this activity 
might reflect an attempt to down-regulate aversive experiences during confrontation with 
conditioned out-group faces. Our analysis over time during Extinction revealed activity 
increasing over time in left amygdala, bilateral fusiform gyrus, and right hippocampus to 
Black compared to White faces (i.e., across CS + and CS −). This is in line with previous 
passive viewing paradigms (Kubota et al., 2012). Our connectivity analysis revealed an 
enhanced coupling between the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus during the acquisition and 
expression of learned fear to Black faces. The enhanced connectivity between the amygdala 
and the FFA in our results is consistent with the notion that the amygdala guides the visual 
system to prioritize encoding of visual information that best predict aversive events or 
threats (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). Importantly, both the amygdala and AI predicted 
interactive behavior. Specifically, individual variability in the preferential passing to the 
White vs. Black co-player, was predicted by an anti-Black learning bias observed in the 
dorsal AI (See Figure 3).  
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Figure 2. Brain activity to CR Black vs. CR White faces during Extinction. (A) 
Overview of the brain regions during Extinction that are significant for CR to Black 
faces (in red), and CR to White faces (in blue), and conjunction for both CR Black and 
CR White faces (in green). For display purposes only, the activation map was displayed 
at a threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons). (B) Bar plots shows 
activation in the left amygdala, right hippocampus, and right and left fusiform gyrus for 
the contrast (Black > White) during Extinction stage indicating changes in activity over 
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time. (C) Bar plot shows overall activation in the left ventral AI for the contrast (Black 
> White) during Extinction stage. (D) Bar plots shows overall activation in the right 
dorsal AI for the contrast (CR Black > CR White) during Extinction stage. The reported 
coordinates are in the MNI space. Error bars denote ± SEM, and activation maps are 
displayed at puncorrected < .01 for display purposes only. 
 
Figure 3. Brain activity predicts behavior. (A) Illustration of the interactive 
environment during the SIT. Participants were presented with one Black and one White 
face and three distractor (racially-morphed) faces. Participants were asked to pass the 
ball to each one of the other players. (B) Significant relationship between activity in left 
dorsal AI for CR Black > CR White during the Extinction stage, and the strength of 
anti-Black SIT bias (i.e., passing less often to the Black faces). (C) Significant 
relationship between activity in right amygdala in response to shock to Black faces, and 
the strength of anti-Black SIT bias. This relationship was not observed for shock to 
White faces. (D) Significant relationship between activity in right amygdala for CR 
Black > CR White during Acquisition and the number of estimated passes to Black 
faces. For illustration purposes, results are displayed at uncorrected significance (p < 
.001) thresholds. 
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4.2 STUDY II: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL DOMINANCE THREAT 
AND RACIAL BIASES 
4.2.1 Study II Background and Rationale 
Humans and non-human animals alike respond especially strong to certain threats. For 
example, research has shown that learned fear towards particular classes of stimuli, such as 
snakes, angry faces, and faces of individuals belonging to social out-groups is more persistent 
(resists extinction) compared to neutral stimuli (e.g., Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005). 
Recently, similar response biases have been extended to faces associated with a high relative 
level of social dominance (Haaker et al., 2016). Social groups are organized along dominance 
hierarchies, which regulate access to food and mates, and help determine who poses a 
physical threat to whom. Therefore, learning about other individuals’ relative dominance and 
adaptively responding to their threat value is central to one’s health and survival (Adler et al., 
2008; Kaplan & Manuck, 1999;Sapolsky, 2005). We investigated the interaction between 
learned dominance and social out-group (ethnicity) threats to understand if dominance 
hierarchy knowledge changes out-group biases. In our paradigm, participants learned the 
social hierarchy of two North-European (NE) and two Middle Eastern (ME) individuals by 
watching their dyadic face-to-face confrontations. Later, participants were conditioned to fear 
the same faces. We were specifically interested in investigating whether indirectly learned 
relative dominance of others influences direct aversive learning (fear conditioning) towards 
the same individuals. We hypothesized that in-group members would be considered more 
dominant and threatening when the participants were passively observing confrontations and 
threats were not directed towards them per se. However, during Pavlovian conditioning, we 
hypothesized that we would find increased skin conductance responses (SCRs) resisting 
extinction to dominant out-group members, as they were directly threatening and relevant to 
the participant. 
4.2.2 Study II Results and Conclusions 
Firstly, we show that the participants correctly learned the relative dominance of the 
individual faces regardless of ethnicity. This is consistent with previous research, 
demonstrating that a confrontation between others is sufficient to learn their social hierarchy 
dominance rank (Jones et al., 2011). Secondly, participants were biased in choosing NE faces 
to be more dominant than ME faces during the observation of the hierarchy phase. This is in 
line with the account that in-group members are more relevant and, possibly, more attended 
to. For example studies have shown that emotions from in-group members are encoded faster 
and more accurately, and empathic responding is stronger to in-group members (in-group 
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members are liked better, their faults are downplayed more, and trust and cooperation are 
extended to in-groups more than to out-groups) (For review, see De Dreu & Kret, 2016). 
Importantly, during direct fear learning, ethnic out-group faces elicited stronger and more 
persistent learned threat responses as measured by physiological arousal. This in line with 
studies showing for example that angry out-group faces are more threatening (Ackerman et 
al., 2006b; Fox et al., 2000). Interestingly, our findings also suggest that measures of explicit 
of biases do not reveal any racial biases, but that implicit measures do. It could be that people 
are driven by egalitarian beliefs and political correctness, but implicit measures reveal 
underlying racial biases. Accordingly, we did not find that learning biases influenced 
behavior in our social interactive task, participants passed the ball equally to all of the co-
players regardless of ethnic background. Our results improve our understanding of how 
learning through observing conflicts between others produces learning about their relative 
dominance, and how this learning is impacted by social group belongingness. Finally, we 
demonstrate how this observational learning subsequently affects learning through direct, 
aversive, experiences (Pavlovian conditioning).  
 
Figure 4.  Skin conductance results. The amplitude of SCRs is shown in 
microsiemens. Fear elicited enhanced SCRs to CSs during (A) Acquisition and again 
during (B) Extinction. Error bars indicate standard deviation (SEM). Asterisks indicates a 
statistically significant difference p < .05. Plus sign indicates a marginally statistically 
significant difference p = .066.   
4.3 STUDY III: AVERSIVE LEARNING INFLUENCES ANTI-SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 
4.3.1 Study III Background and Rationale  
We wanted to investigate the role of aversive learning in retaliatory behavior in social 
interactive context. One of the oldest ideas in psychology is that human behavior is 
governed by likes and dislikes formed about others. Indeed, people prefer to spend time 
with individuals they learned to like, and try to avoid, or aggress toward those they learned 
to be afraid of or dislike. Although adaptive in some situations, anti-social behaviors, such 
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as avoiding, aggressing, or punishing others, can be detrimental in social interactions. In 
two experiments (n = 35, n = 34), we used a modified fear-conditioning paradigm to 
investigate the role of aversive learning in retaliatory behavior in social context. 
Participants first completed an initial aversive learning phase in which the pairing of a 
neutral conditioned stimulus (CS; i.e., neutral face) with a naturally aversive unconditioned 
stimulus (US; i.e., electric shock) was learned. Then they were given an opportunity to 
interact with the same faces again, during a Test phase, with the possibility to administer 
shocks (i.e., administer 0–2 shocks). We hypothesized that if learned aversions would 
influence retaliatory behavior, participants would administer more shocks to the faces that 
were previously paired with most number of shocks (i.e., CS++, and CS+).  
4.3.2 Study III Results and Conclusion 
In this study we examined the role of aversive learning in retaliatory behavior. We used 
classical fear conditioning with an added Test phase allowing for social interactive 
behavior. This provided an opportunity to examine the strength of aversive learning about 
specific individuals and its influence on subsequent social interactive behavior with the 
same individuals. In two separate experiments, we demonstrate how previously learned 
aversions influence future retaliatory behavior. In both experiments, we found that 
participants showed the largest SCRs to the faces paired with one or two shocks during 
Acquisition, indicating successful aversive learning. These findings were corroborated with 
US Expectancy ratings in Experiment 2. Most importantly, we demonstrated that 
participants administered more shocks to the individuals delivering the most number of 
shocks when the opportunity was given during the subsequent Test phase. Our findings are 
consistent with results on evaluative conditioning, showing that repeated pairings of CSs 
and USs influence subsequent evaluative judgments of the CSs (De Houwer et al., 2001; 
Baeyens et al., 2005; Walther et al., 2005), and classical fear conditioning studies showing 
that learned fear associations influence behavior (e.g., pathogenesis of anxiety disorders; 
Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006). However, our results go beyond these findings and show that 
pairings of CS and aversive US enhanced retaliatory behavior toward another person in a 
social context.  
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Figure 5. Administration of shocks and SCR results Experiment 1. (A) Average 
number of administered shock to each CS during the test phase, showing a linear 
increase in punishing behavior as a function of received shocks. (B) The amplitude of 
SCRs in microSiemens, showing strongest SCRs to CS+ relative CS- during 
Acquisition. Error bars indicate standard deviation (SEM). Asterisks indicates a 
statistically significant difference p < .05. 
 
Figure 6. Administration of Shocks, SCR, US Expectancy and Anger results 
Experiment 2. (A) Average number of administered shocks to each CS during the Test 
phase, showing a linear increase in punishing behavior as a function of received shocks. 
(B) The amplitude of SCRs is shown in microSiemens, showing stronger SCRs CS++, CS+ 
relative to CS- during Acquisition. (C) Mean US Expectancy ratings to CS++, CS+ and 
CS- during Acquisition. (C) Mean online Anger ratings to CS++, CS+ and CS- during 
Acquisition. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean (SEM). Asterisks indicate a 
statistically significant differences p <.05. 
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4.4 STUDY IV: RECIPROCAL PUNISHMENT IN DYADIC SOCIAL 
INTERACTIONS 
4.4.1 Study IV Background and Rationale 
In this study, we wanted to examine the basic mechanisms underlying retaliatory behaviors as 
can be seen in varying forms of conflicts in dyadic social interactions which can lead to 
vendettas and vicious cycles of aggression. Certain environmental events that are perceived 
as threatening, frustrating, or provocative, by someone can lead to responses such as 
avoidance or aggression—which are usually adaptive (Blanchard et al., 1977). However, 
aggression can also be maladaptive—as a result of heightened reactivity of the threat 
response system (Blair, 2007). Importantly, studies have shown that maladaptive behavior 
can be self-reinforced; it has been demonstrated in several species including rats (J. S. Brown 
et al., 1964) monkeys (Kelleher & Morse, 1968; McKearney, 1969) and humans (Renner & 
Tinsley, 1976) that learned contingencies  between a behavior and an outcome are difficult to 
unlearn (even if they are maladaptive). This indicates that behaviors with aversive outcomes 
(i.e., maladaptive) can be self-reinforced (Seymour et al., 2007). We hypothesize that self-
reinforcing punishment in social interactions can be a factor in why vendettas emerge.  To 
investigate the role of these potential mechanisms in retaliatory exchanges experimentally, 
we devised a new dyadic interactive paradigm in which participants could chose whether to 
administer one, many, or no shocks to an alleged co-participant. Separately, as an application 
of our experimental results to a real world setting, we examined online behavior of 
commenters in dyadic interactions in an Internet forum. We expected that people would 
engage in vicious cycles of verbal exchanges online resulting in verbal feuds analogous to 
what we observe in our experimental paradigms.  
4.4.2 Study IV Results and Conclusions 
This study reveals that individuals punish an anonymous co-player despite the fact that their 
punishing behavior resulted in receiving exactly the same punishment back from the ‘co-
player’ and lead to a potentially long-standing vendetta. These findings describe a form of 
self-punitive behavior previously documented in animals. The participants’ tendencies to 
administer shocks were exacerbated when the co-player initiated punishment, indicating that 
a small initial offense motivated punishing behavior over time. The best predictor for 
administration of shocks was the number of shocks participants received on a previous trial. 
The Internet data corroborated the experimental data; in online dyadic interactions the level 
of aggressive comments previously received predicted the level of aggressive comment sent 
back. The results from this study improve our understanding of the processes underlying 
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common destructive social phenomena where people punish others even at a cost to 
themselves. 
 
Figure 7. Reciprocation of punishment.  (A) Mean number of administered shocks in 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3. (B) The mean number of shocks participants received on a 
previous trial predicted how many shocks they gave to the co-player in Experiments 1-3. 
Error bars represent the SEM. *p < 0.05. (C) Internet data: The degree of aggressive 
comments received predicted the degree of aggressive comments reciprocated.  
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5 DISCUSSION  
An improved grasp on the impact of aversive experiences in social contexts is critical for the 
understanding of human interactive behavior. The overall aim of the studies presented in this 
thesis was to investigate how aversive experiences influence behavioral and brain responses 
in social contexts. Our general approach was to develop simple experimental paradigms to 
capture the underlying mechanisms of aversive experiences and social interactions. In Study 
I, we examined the neural basis of fear conditioning to racial in-and out-group members, and 
found that differences in brain responses were related to differences in actual interactive 
behavior at a later time. In Study II, we found that when participants observed others’ 
interactions, they learned the social dominance hierarchy of racial in-group members better 
than racial out-group members. However, during direct aversive encounters (Pavlovian 
conditioning) with the same individuals, participants showed stronger and more persistent 
learned threat responses to racial out-group members. Study III showed that aversive 
learning through fear conditioning influenced future retaliatory behaviors, and Study IV 
found that individuals punished others even when maladaptive (i.e., received the same 
number of shocks back), which led to a vicious cycle of aggression. The participants’ 
tendencies to administer shocks were exacerbated when the co-player initiated the 
punishment, indicating that a small initial offense motivated punishing behavior over time. 
We also examined a real-world example of this behavior using comment exchanges from an 
Internet forum, which corroborated our experimental results. Here, I will briefly discuss some 
general theoretical and methodological questions and conclusions gleaned from these studies.  
      Examining the neural correlates of fear learning of racial in- and out-group members in 
Study I, revealed activity in two overlapping networks of brain regions, one which has 
previously been linked to conditioned fear, and the other to the perception of racial out-group 
members. We observed that differential brain activity in these two networks was related to 
biased behavior based on race. In accordance with our predictions we found enhanced 
activity in the dorsal AI for CR to Black vs. White faces during Extinction, which is 
indicative of aversive subjective experiences (Craig, 2009) and processing of stigmatized 
individuals (Harris & Fiske, 2006). This area has also been functionally connected to the 
brain's cognitive control network (Dosenbach et al., 2007) that is implicated in monitoring 
and control of conflicts between emotional responses and egalitarian motives (Amodio, 
Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008). In line with previous studies on passive viewing of racial 
out-group faces, we also found enhanced activity in the amygdala, fusiform gyrus, and 
hippocampus to out-group faces during Extinction. The enhanced activity in these regions to 
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out-group faces, is consistent with research showing enhanced activity related to processing 
emotionally salient stimuli (e.g., unpleasant) (Kober, Barrett, & Joseph, 2008; Sabatinelli, 
Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 2005; Straube, Mentzel, & Miltner, 2006), and threatening 
faces (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003). It is also important to note that facial 
stimuli in our study reflected greater threat value resulting from direct aversive learning 
experiences to the faces, compared to passive viewing paradigms. 
     Although most of our predictions were based on differential CRs to out-group faces during 
Extinction in line with previous studies (measuring SCRs) (e.g., Olsson et. al., 2005), our 
results also demonstrated race dependent differences of brain activity during the acquisition 
of conditioned fear. Specifically, we found a greater time-dependent CR effect in the 
amygdala for White (vs. Black) faces during Acquisition. The amygdala activity increased 
over time to the Black CS− and White CS+ faces, whereas responses to the Black CS+ and 
White CS– did not change over time. We believe that the relatively stronger differentiation of 
White faces during the acquisition could reflect a general in-group advantage in individuating 
and recognizing faces (Golby et al., 2001; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). Along the same 
reasoning, a weaker individuation between the two Black out-group faces might have 
contributed to a greater generalization of fear response to the unsafe Black CS+ and the safe 
Black CS− (Dunsmoor, White, & LaBar, 2011; Vervliet, Kindt, Vansteenwegen, & Hermans, 
2010). An alternative explanation of these results is that the safe Black (CS−) and the unsafe 
White (CS+) stimuli both violated the race stereotype (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001), resulting 
in enhanced amygdala responses over time.  
     Additionally, we examined connectivity changes between a pre-defined seed region (i.e., 
amygdala) and the rest of the brain. Our connectivity analysis with the amygdala revealed 
functional connectivity between the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus associated with CRs to 
out-group faces. Interestingly, this enhanced connectivity (i.e., between the amygdala and the 
fusiform gyrus) during the learning and expression of learned fear to Black faces occurred 
both during Acquisition and Extinction stages. This enhanced amygdala—FFA coupling in 
our results is consistent with the idea that the amygdala helps guide the visual system to 
prioritize encoding of visual information that can predict aversive events or threats (Anderson 
and Phelps, 2001). Further, it is also possible that the threat value affected the coding of 
Black and White faces differently after pairing with an aversive event (i.e., an electric shock), 
which is reflected in the enhanced connectivity between the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus 
for the CR to Black faces in our results. This is in support of previous studies showing that 
out- vs. in-group faces are better remembered when they are potentially threatening 
(Ackerman et al., 2006).  
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     Another important contribution was that we showed that brain activity in the racial-fear-
learning-bias network was related to the participants' discriminatory interactions with novel 
out-group members on a later day. Specifically, we found that the AI activity observed for 
CRs to Black vs. White faces during Extinction predicted subsequent social interactions with 
unfamiliar Black and White individuals, in our modified version of Cyberball (i.e., Social 
interactive task; SIT). Individual variability in preferential passing to the White vs. Black co-
player, was predicted by an anti-Black learning bias observed in the dorsal AI. The link 
between the AI and a discriminatory bias is indicative of research describing the AI as 
important in the processing of stigmatized individuals (Harris and Fiske, 2006), and decision 
making during uncertainty (Lamm & Singer, 2010; Singer et al., 2009). 
     The link between the participants’ brain activity (reflecting biased learning and extinction 
responses to out-groups) and their subsequent interactive behavior indicated that those who 
showed a learning bias towards Black individuals also tended to display more discriminatory 
behaviors. This observation might be characteristic of the individuals, could reflect the 
aversive learning experience itself, or might reflect a combination of both. Unfortunately, 
with our current data we cannot differentiate between these alternative explanations. 
Nevertheless, our findings are the first to identify the neural mechanism of fear learning 
biases towards out-group members, and its relationship to interactive behavior. Moreover, 
our findings provide important clues towards understanding the mechanisms underlying 
biases between social groups. 
      In Study II, we followed up the study of group biases seen in Study I in a more dynamic 
and interactive social context. We examined the interaction between knowledge about 
individuals’ social dominance rank and ethnic group belonging during aversive learning (i.e., 
fear conditioning). We wanted to understand how the interaction of others’ relative social 
dominance and ethnicity impacted learning and behavior. Critically, we showed that the 
participants correctly learned the relative dominance of the individual faces (i.e., dominant 
and subordinate), regardless of ethnicity. Specifically, our findings indicate that despite the 
fact that there was a hierarchy learning bias to in-group faces during observational hierarchy 
learning, during direct Pavlovian fear learning, the participants showed stronger and more 
persistent learned threat responses to out-group faces. Our results suggest that different 
theoretical accounts could help to explain why dominance and ethnicity interact in different 
ways during indirect learning of dominance and direct learning of threat. We propose two 
different possible accounts based on the ‘relevancy’ and ‘additive’ threat value of the facial 
stimuli. According to the ‘relevancy’ account, in-group members that are more likely to be 
competing over resources in day-to-day situations (Flinn, Geary, & Ward, 2005) are 
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perceived as a greater threat than out-group individuals. The ‘additive’ account, suggests that 
the threat value of posing aggressively (i.e., high in relative dominance in our paradigm) is 
added to the threat value of out-group members in accordance with previous studies (e.g. 
Olsson et al., 2005). The additive account finds further support in findings showing that 
although people often find it more difficult to distinguish between ethnic out-group members 
(compared to ethnic in-group members) (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Ostrom & 
Sedikides, 1992). However, the opposite is true when out-group members display threatening 
facial expressions, suggesting that out-group members do not become relevant or ‘important’ 
unless they pose a threat to the person (Ackerman et al., 2006b).   
     Interestingly, the participants that had a high IAT score (indicating an implicit bias against 
Middle Eastern people) also showed higher SCRs to Middle Eastern faces compared to North 
European faces during acquisition. However, the participants did not display any explicit 
ethnic biases (e.g., self-reports and interactive ball tossing) even though their learning was 
clearly biased. That is, dominance learning was facilitated for in-group faces, but when faces 
were paired with a direct aversive consequence (during Pavlovian conditioning) dominant 
out-group faces acquired a stronger threat value as evidenced in more persistent threat 
responses. The lack of explicit biases likely reflects egalitarian beliefs and political 
correctness.  
     In both Studies I and II we show that individuals associate racial out-group members 
more easily with an aversive stimulus, but it remains to explain why such biases exist. 
Previous research have suggested that prepared fear learning is a biologically evolved 
learning mechanisms that regard certain natural categories of stimuli as prepared to be 
associated with an aversive outcome (Öhman & Dimberg, 1996; Seligman, 1970). From an 
evolutionary perspective, it means that there is an advantage to have a prepared learning 
bias towards threat-relevant stimuli such as snakes and spiders, angry faces and socially 
dominant others because it appropriately signals threat.  
However, understanding threats towards racial out-groups is unlikely to have the same 
evolutionary basis. Unlike the social sensitivity to dynamic dominance hierarchies seen 
across taxa, social categorizations based on racial differences among humans occurred 
relatively recently in human evolutionary history (Molnar, 1998); therefore it is unlikely that 
responses to racial differences have a strong genetic bases (Cosmides, Tooby, Fiddick, & 
Bryant, 2005). Race in itself is unlikely to explain the types of biases that we observe in our 
studies. However, even if a genetic predisposition to preferentially learn from in-group 
individuals do exist, this is likely to be influenced by socially and culturally acquired attitudes 
towards racial groups (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Further, humans might have evolved a more 
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general preparedness to fear others who were dissimilar to them and not belonging to their 
social group because such individuals were more likely to pose a threat (Hamilton, 1964; 
Manson & Wrangham, 1991). If a general preparedness to fear out-groups did indeed 
evolve, then today’s out-group members (as categorized by physical differences) could 
merely reflect a general out-group bias and therefore produce the conditioning effects we 
observe in our studies. 
In Study I, we found that individual variability in preferential ball passing to the White 
vs. Black co-player was predicted by an anti-Black learning bias observed in the dorsal AI; 
which indicated that implicit measures can reveal biases in future behaviors. However, 
examining the relationship between our implicit measures (i.e., SCRs) and future social 
interactive behavior in Study II did not reveal a significant relationship. Although threat-
elicited amygdala response has commonly been found to be correlated with threat-elicited 
SCRs (Cheng et al., 2006; Dunsmoor, Martin, & LaBar, 2012; Wood et al., 2014), the 
amygdala appears to mediate important aspects of the peripheral emotional response to 
threat that SCRs do not (Wood et al., 2014). Perhaps using fMRI in Study II would have 
revealed brain responses predicting social interactive behaviors that were not observed with 
SCRs.  Further, the two studies were designed differently, one critical difference was that in 
Study II we had an observation of dominance learning phase, which could have influenced 
the learning and expression of fear responses during Pavlovian conditioning.   
An important limitation of Studies I and II is that we only included White participants, 
which limits the generalizability of our conclusions to other social out-groups. Although 
previous behavioral studies have shown similar results for other categories of social out-
groups (Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2011; Navarrete et al., 2012), further research needs 
to examine the neural mechanisms of learning biases to other out-groups to better understand 
the generalizability of these biases. Further, in both Studies I and II, male and female 
participants were included in our experimental samples, whereas only male faces served as 
CSs. Therefore, female participants belonged to an additional out-group (i.e., gender), which 
could have influenced the results. However, we carefully examined the role of gender in our 
results, which did not reveal any differences based on gender, which is in agreement with 
previous findings on a race related learning bias (Golkar, Björnstjerna, & Olsson, 2015; 
Navarrete et al., 2012; Olsson et al., 2005).  
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     In Study III, in two experiments, we demonstrated how previously learned aversions 
influenced future retaliatory behaviors.  Participants showed largest SCRs to the faces 
paired with one or two shocks during Acquisition, which demonstrated successful aversive 
learning. Specifically, we showed that the participants administered more shocks to the 
individuals delivering the most number of shocks when the opportunity was given during 
the subsequent Test phase. However, we did not find a significant relationship between 
physiological arousal and retaliatory behavior. This finding is in contrast to previous 
research showing that general arousal and aggressive cues combine to increase aggression 
(Bandura, 1973; Berkowitz & Lepage, 1967). Interestingly, our results show that anger 
toward CSs paired with shocks and general aggressive traits increased the likelihood of 
administering shocks to the aversively reinforced faces (i.e., CS+), but not to the non-
aversively reinforced face (i.e, CS−). This is in accordance with studies that show that 
anger is a key motivator of aggression (e.g., assaulting, attacking, kicking; Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2007; Frijda; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Rule & Nesdale, 1976). Examining 
of the relationship between aggressive trait, trial by-trial anger, and the administration of 
shocks revealed that trait aggression mediated the impact of trial-by-trial anger towards, 
and the administration of shocks given to, co-players. These findings are in line with 
theories of aggression describing an interaction between person and situational factors 
influencing aggressive behaviors (Anderson and Bushman, 2001). There are several 
possible explanations for why the participants’ retaliatory behaviors increased toward the 
aversively reinforced CSs. The participants might have felt unfairly/unjustly treated, and 
that punishing the other person would ‘balance out’ the situation (i.e., retribution). Another 
explanation is that the participants might have attempted to alter the future behavior of the 
norm transgressor (co-player) by teaching them that acting unfairly does not pay (i.e., 
deterrence). Both retribution and deterrence are known motivators of human punishment 
(Crockett, Özdemir, & Fehr, 2014). The participants also could have punished the co-player 
simply to harm them out of spite (de Quervain et al., 2004), because anger-induced 
punishment can give pleasure to the punisher (Berkowitz, 1993).  
      In Study IV, we investigated retaliatory exchanges experimentally in a novel dyadic 
interactive paradigm in which the participants chose whether to administer one, many, or no 
shocks to an alleged co-participant. The participants’ decisions to administer shocks resulted 
in receiving exactly the same number of shocks back from the alleged co-player. In this way, 
the optimal decision (i.e., avoid getting shocks) was to avoid giving shocks to the co-player. 
In contrast to Study III, where punishing someone based on previous aversive experiences 
could be regarded as adaptive (e.g., deterrence and retribution), in Study IV we wanted to 
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examine punishing behavior when it was maladaptive. In three experiments we showed that 
the participants administered shocks to a co-player, even when resulting in receiving same 
number of shocks back (maladaptive) and under the direct (but implicit) control of the 
participant.  
     Why do people engage in maladaptive reciprocal punishments? There are several potential 
explanations for why people might engage in maladaptive punitive behavior, which can lead 
to extended vicious cycles of aggression and possible vendettas. Our results lead us to three 
possible explanations: First, people might feel justified to punish the other person simply on 
the basis of a ‘the other person started it’ standpoint (Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 
2008). Exploring the difference between punishing behavior when the participants were 
provoked (i.e., Experiment 1) vs. unprovoked (i.e., Experiment 2), we found that, although 
provocation significantly increased overall punishment initially, in the long-run punishing 
behavior did not seem to differ. This indicates that the initial discomfort and other aversive 
emotions that initially provoked the participant might have dissipated over time. The 
participants might have based their behavior on a moment-to-moment basis rather than an 
overall estimation of what had happened from the beginning. Indeed, our analysis 
investigating the relationship between the number of received shocks on a given trial and the 
number of shocks administered on the previous trial strengthens this argument: decisions to 
administer shocks were directly influenced by how many shocks they had received from the 
co-player on the previous trial. This is in accordance with studies that show ‘eye-for-an-eye’ 
counter-punishments to restore equity, where high punishments are reciprocated with high 
punishments (Stillwell et al., 2008). In line with the analytic strategy used in Study III, we 
pooled data across the two experiments of Study IV. Interestingly, this also revealed that trait 
aggression and trait anxiety predicted the administration of shocks in general, strengthening 
the conclusion that personality factors influence aggression (Anderson, Buckley, & 
Carnagey, 2008). We believe this paradigm has advantages over previous ones examining 
maladaptive aggression and vendettas, mainly because our paradigm is devoid of explicitly 
instructed motivations to punish and behave aggressively, uses dyadic interactions, and 
examines the self-reinforcing nature of vendettas. Economists have used public goods games 
to explain possible mechanisms of punishment and the emergence of vendettas (Denant-
Boemont, Masclet, & Noussair, 2007; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). Only a few studies 
have examined punishment in dyadic repeated interactions (compared to group interactions) 
and have shown that vendettas are rare in this context (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 
2008; Fehl, Sommerfeld, Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2012; Fehl, van der Post, & 
Semmann, 2011). However, as we know from many instances in life vendettas do occur in 
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dyadic interactions (e.g., bullying). Further, these economic games use monetary gains and 
losses, suggesting that vendettas occur within the realm of economic interests. However, 
economic public goods games do not help understanding conflicts that emerge in absence of 
economic factors in dyadic interactions. In social psychological paradigms that investigate 
punishment there are instructed motivations to punish others, such as requirements to punish 
a peer for incorrect answers, to improve others’ task performance, or competitiveness to 
avoid loss or receiving shocks (Baron & Eggleston, 1972;Rule & Nesdale, 1974; Taylor, 
Gammon, & Capasso, 1976). Cover stories are usually used in these paradigms to ensure that 
there is a specific purpose to punish or act aggressively towards another person (in order to 
measure the participants’ propensity to do so). For these reasons, past research is limited 
where the basic processes of reciprocal punishment that lead to vicious cycles of aggression 
and vendettas in social dyadic interactions is concerned. The current models of reciprocal 
aggression and vendettas do not show that maladaptive vendettas occur nor explain how these 
types of aggressive acts persist and are reciprocated between strangers online (Dreber et al., 
2008; Fehl et al., 2012, 2011). 
     One possible limitation in Studies III and IV, and other social psychology paradigms 
examining aggression in social contexts, is that the participants might feel the need to 
comply with what they believe is the appropriate behavior in the laboratory (Zizzo, 2010). 
However, to offset this problem, the participants had the option to give zero shocks in both 
studies (Study III and IV), and the possibility to avoid seeing the face (by removing it) in 
Study III, which are both non-aggressive options. If the participants decided to administer 
shocks, the explanation is less likely to be related to experimental demand characteristics, 
as giving no shocks is the more socially desirable behavior. To support this, in the post-
experimental interviews, participants reported retributive motives for administering shocks, 
and none of the participants reported that they chose to administer shocks in order to adhere 
to the demands the experiment. However, we cannot fully rule out this possibility, and 
future studies should take this into account.  
     As with most experimental paradigms specifically investigating aggression/anti-social 
behaviors, and experimental models of complex phenomena in general, the external validity 
of such experiments (i.e., probability to generalize to situations outside the laboratory) is 
limited (see Tedeschi and Bond, 2001). One caveat to our experimental paradigms is that 
giving and receiving shocks in a laboratory setting is different from real-life aggressive 
behaviors. However, others have argued that there is direct and indirect support for 
aggression paradigms in many research domains (e.g., Anderson and Bushman, 2001). 
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Furthermore, in Study IV, we used interactions from an Internet discussion forum 
(resembling dyadic interactions in our paradigm) where we showed that the basic 
mechanisms for maladaptive reciprocal punishments could explain similar behaviors outside 
of the laboratory. Although we demonstrate that people engage in maladaptive punishment, 
we cannot really say why such behaviors should have evolved, and what the basis for these 
types of punishments are. Future studies should examine other real-world scenarios to obtain 
a more comprehensive understanding of why irrational punishments occur.  Additionally, the 
results of Study III in this thesis indicated that the participants reciprocated punishments to 
those who were associated with aversive events when given the possibility. Future research 
can make use of this paradigm to examine whether this is true in real-life scenarios where 
direct punishment is not always a suitable option (e.g., workplace). 
     The fear-conditioning paradigm that is used in this thesis to investigate the role of social 
aversive learning in social contexts extends previous findings showing that our aversive 
experiences are processed differently based on whom we learn from. There is a need for more 
research on fear conditioning and extinction processes using other social groups (i.e., other 
than racial) to gain additional understanding of the neural, physiological, and behavioral 
mechanisms as well as the generalizability of our results. One critical question is whether 
racial biases that we observe in our experiments can be inhibited. That is, are there any 
intervention strategies that can diminish the chances that aversive experiences have 
dysfunctional consequences? A few studies have investigated intervention strategies in the 
laboratory by using tasks in which images of racial out-group members are repeatedly paired 
with positive images and appetitive responses or with counter-stereotypical concepts. Others 
have suggested more control-based strategies, where people learn to attend to specific cues 
(in interactions with out-group members) in order to down-regulate their biases.   Although 
these interventions have been effective to some degree, whether the positive changes that 
result from them are maintained outside of the laboratory where racial prejudices and 
stereotypes are often reinforced by, for example, media exposure remains unknown. 
Although these strategies might not eliminate prejudice altogether, they may help reduce 
some behaviors that may be detrimental to victims of prejudice (i.e., out-group members). 
    In conclusion, it is clear that aversive learning plays an important role in social 
interactions. Specifically, we find that aversive learning in social context differs (e.g., as 
indicated by neural and psychophysiological differences) based on whom we learn about; and 
aversive learning also influences anti-social behaviors (e.g., behavior in a ball tossing game, 
or punishment behavior). Further, it is also evident that people punish others even when it 
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comes at a direct physical cost to themselves, indicating a self-reinforcing punishing behavior 
that can lead to vicious cycles of aggression. 
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